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BOOK FEATURE
STATES OF LAWS AND LAWS OF STATES: A REVIEW
JOSEPH H. BUNZEL*
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S
DEMOCRACIES, by Prof. Istvan Szaszy, LL.D.** Budapest: Aka-
demiai Kiado, The Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy
of Science, 1964. Pp. 403, $6.50.
An interesting phenomenon in intergroup and international re-
lations is the tendency to devalue and debunk ethnocentrically
the basic institutions of the out-group. Thus we find people dis-
paraging unaccustomed food, despising unfamiliar religious prac-
tices, and finding mores and folkways of the stranger abhorrent,
his country barbaric and devoid of culture worthy of the name.
Among these institutions which are usually the butt of criticism
and disrespect are frequently, if not always, the legal institutions
of the country. Thus, it is not especially strange that in the time
of the great east-west schism legal institutions in both camps are
considered not legal at all, the states developing and perpetuating
such institutions hardly more than pseudo-legal, their justice cer-
tainly a quite unjust and unjustifiable accumulation of laws.
There is one sphere, however, in which these legal institutions
and laws must, by force of necessity, become reconciled or in some
way interconnected-the field of international law. We welcomed
therefore the opportunity to review this extremely interesting and
in fact significant book from what is frequently referred to in this
country as the land of double-think, because it enables us to look
behind the Iron Curtain and to gain insight into the legal mind
of communistic socialism."
GENERAL PART: SUBJECT AND SYSTEMS
The author is quite right in stating that the socialist revolution
Associate Professor of Sociology, University of North Dakota. J.D. 1932, Universityof Vienna.
**Associate Member of the Hungarian Academy of Science.1. In addition to the jurists referred to in the text and bibliography the author cites
specifically Lunz for the Soviet orbit, Reczei for Hungary, Ludwiczak for Poland, Wiemanfor East Germany, all of whom, except Ludwiczak, are at least partially translated intoGerman and thus easily accessible to western jurists; of the American authorities on
conflict of laws the author cites Ehrenzweig and Rabel, as well as the RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF CONFLICT Or LAws (1934. Supp. 1948), but not the RESTATEMENT 2d. now in.
preparation.
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after the First World War "changed the aspect of the world." 2
With the arrival of socialist states, their relations with western
states as well as among themselves had to be rethought. Whereas
relations between sovereign states themselves are dealt with through
public international law, the relations between the enterprises and
economic organizations of the various states are regulated by private
international law. The author uses his enormous knowledge of
the literature, and nearly 500 references, to show how the concept
of private international law has been changed in the various Euro-
pean people's democracies, specifically Albania, Bulgaria, Czecho-
slovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Rumania, with frequent references to the U.S.S.R. and occasional
consideration of legal doctrines of the Chinese People's Republic.
In his opinion, "private international law is the sum-total of the
legal norms which govern-partly by direct legal provisions (rules
of substantive law), partly by indirect legal provisions (conflict
rules)-the civil, family and labour law relations of international
character which are related to several legal systems and consequent-
ly contain foreign elements. '" Thus he includes copyright, patent,
and trademarks, in addition to obligations (contracts), sales, labor,
family laws, and laws of succession.
In line with general socialist thinking, Professor Szaszy disap-
proves of the term private international law, because "socialist
private international law is neither international, nor private ...
not international because it does not govern reciprocal legal re-
lations between states, but those between natural and legal persons,
citizens and economic organizations. . . . not private because in
socialist societies economic conditions have no private character" 4 ;
he then cites Lenin, "we do not recognize anything 'private', for us,
in the domain of economics, everything belongs to public, not private
law." Nevertheless, he is in favor of keeping the term for con-
venience sake. Of course, the learned author is quite aware that
in Anglo-American law the term conflict of laws is customary but
he makes no attempt to break with continental, particularly French
and Austrian tradition.
"The starting point of the theory of the private international
law of people's democratic countries, is the foreign policy of the
country concerned; the content of these rules is determined by
the general aspects of foreign policy of that country.'" It follows
that any discrimination between socialist states is inadmissible;
it also follows that discrimination against western states will be





6. P. 16. (Reviewer's italics).
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approved of under certain circumstances, specifically if the case
in question should prove contrary to the public policies of the re-
spective people's democracy. Consequently, "the number of cases
in which the judge is authorized to set aside the application of a
legal foreign rule by invoking the specific policy of his country,
i.e., the clause of ordre public, should be restricted as far as pos-
sible. ' 7 Thus he inveighs particularly against western judgments
in expropriation cases which did not recognize laws of socialist
states.
Not only the concept, but also the object of private international
law is subjected to different interpretations. Professor Szaszy points
out, correctly, that there is no more uniformity among western
powers than among eastern. In France as well as in other countries
of Romance languages, the subject matter of private international
law is quite comprehensive, whereas "Anglo-American theory re-
gards the procedural aspect as its starting point. . . .- 8 The
German, Swiss, and Scandinavian theories as well as the French
and Anglo-Saxon are rejected by the socialist theory of private
international law.
Szaszy's elaboration of the socialist theory indicates that he,
and most of the sources he relies upon, favor application of the
lex patriae. Szaszy's whole treatise, in fact, appears directed
against Ehrenzweig's attempt to base the law of conflict of laws
on the lex fori. Ehrenzweig's treatise9 was therefore selected for
comparative purposes as a representative treatment of modern
American conflicts law. 10 In spite of the fact that the two authors
appear miles apart in theory, they frequently come far closer to
common practical applications than perhaps either one of them
would be willing to admit.
Professor Szaszy makes the very interesting point that "the
overriding question is not the rules of law of which state are to
be applied but another one, namely, in what manner should these
relations be regulated.""
Again quoting profusely from a tremendous literature, both
east and west, Professor Szaszy points out the cleavage in the
capitalist camp between "the so-called internationalist theory, in-
spired by natural law and of a universalistic character" and the
"so-called nationalist opinion, based on positivist foundations and
7. Pp. 19-20.
8. P. 21.
9. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962). Ehrenzweig's index does not even con-
tain the term lex patriae; however, he, as well as most authors, speaks of "nationality."
10. Interestingly enough Ehrenzweig was almost alone among modern American schol-
ars cited by Szaszy. See his bibliography, pp. 80'-401.
11. Pp. 37-38. It cannot be the purpose of this review to contribute to the compara-
tive literature on conflict of laws; suffice it to say that what Ehrenzweig seems to say
is that the law of the proper forum should be applied, a standpoint which in praxi do"
not seem to be too far distant from Szaszy's.
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of a particularistic character .... -12 Both are united, according
to the author, in modern Soviet writings so that private interna-
tional law is not considered part of public international law, but
rather part of the domestic legal system of the state in which it is
applied. According to Professor Szaszy, private international law
cannot be considered as part of civil law nor as part of economic
law either. It is simply "an independent branch of the domestic
legal system."18
Sources
The sources of private international law in people's democracies
include the provisions of domestic laws, international conventions
and international custom, but not jurisprudence (the body of legal
knowledge) .,14 Moreover, we see that they are greatly influenced
by the old Austrian draft of 1913. This should not come as a surprise
to anybody who realizes that the territory of the people's demo-
cracies either formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or were
and are considerably influenced by its legal system. Moreover,
most of the people's democracies adhered to any number of con-
ventions either under their old territorial boundaries or in the
inter-war years or later as independent socialist states. Professor
Szaszy attaches the greatest importance to constitutional acts of
the new states-but only in the German Democratic Republic,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland are separate unified codes of private
international law in force, not in the Soviet Union; the one in the
Chinese People's Republic has been repealed.1 5 Some states under
discussion "are parties to the extensive multi-lateral conventions
on private international law, but most of them, like the Soviet
Union, are not parties to these."16  Professor Szaszy admits, of
course, that the German and Polish laws were enacted prior to
the establishment of the people's democracies. He then indicates
that some people's democratic states are parties to the extensive
multi-lateral international conventions; so for instance, the German
12. P. 41. For concurrence and further explanation, see EHRENZWxIG passim.
13. P. .49.
14. P. 56. It seems that Professor Szaszy uses the term "jurisprudence" in the French
sense of Judicial practice.
15. P. 57. With regard to the Austrian draft of 1913, Professor Walker makes thiscomment: Theory recognized and practice felt that the regulation of private internationallaw was meager and inefficient. In revising the Allgemelnes Buergerliches Gesetzbuch(General Code of Civil Law) of Austria, it was noted that the code contained many very
real gaps and that there were no appropriate provisions for questions on internationalprivate law included. Therefore, the Austrian Herrenhaus (Upper Chamber) resolved onDecember 19, 1912 to request the government to accelerate as much as possible a speciallaw on international private law. Professor Walker, as Chief of the International Division
of the Ministry of Justice at the time, worked out the draft of a law in 1913, but ap-parently because of the war, it never reached Parliament. WALKER, INTERNATIONALESParvATREcHi' 53 (5th ed. 1934) (paraphrased and translated by reviewer). Rabel statesthat "The excellent Austrian draft of 1913 of an international private law . . . servedas the basis of the Important Polish Law of August 2, 1926 (whose principal author Zollhad been a member of the Vienna draft committee), as well as for the CzechoslovakianLaw of March 11, 1948. Indirectly the German law has influenced all more recent legis-lative projects in Europe." 1 RABEL, THE CONFLicT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 30(2d ed. 1958).
16. P. 58.
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Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Ru-
mania are parties to the convention of the Hague of July 17, 1905,
on civil procedure and in interdiction of incapable persons, among
others of the same date.
It would be of great interest to follow the meanderings of these
conventions on liens, industrial property, copyright and others, from
the convention of Madrid (April 14, 1891) on. Depending upon the
content of the legal provisions these conventions are bi-lateral (for
instance in the cases of presumption of death and of marriage).
In the former "the lex patriae shall apply and jurisdiction shall
be vested with the authorities of the home country";' 7 in the latter
case "the formal validity of marriage shall be adjudged in accord-
ance with the lex loci actus, and the substantive conditions of
marriage in conformity with the lex patriae of each party to the
marriage."18
With regard to codification of private international law we find
that most of the people's democracies, namely Albania, Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Rumania have no unified codes. Czechoslovakia,
however, has an act of international private law and a rich harvest
of "bi-lateral commercial treaties bearing on private international
law with Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Great Britain,
Greece, Hungary, Iran, Iceland, Jugoslavia, 9 Lebanon, Liberia,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania,
Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Union of
Belgium-Luxemburg, and Union of South Africa. ' '20
Literature of Choice of Law Rules
In studying private international law in people's democratic
countries, a distinction should be made in the literature before
and after the socialist revolution. Again the so-called successor
states either in toto or partially will have been influenced by the
Austrian theory of pre-World War I and their mutual relationships
in the inter-war period.
"The science of private international law of the people's demo-
cratic countries as well as that of the Soviet Union are characterized
first of all by the circumstance that they consider private interna-
17. P. 70.
18. P. 71.
19. This is one of the few instances in which the author takes cognizance of the
existence of Yugoslavia (difference in spelling is due to the fact of our quoting from
the book under review). Yugoslavia is, of course, a socialist-communist state and should
be an interesting go-between of the east and west. In fact both Szaszy and Ehrenzweig
mention BlagoJevic's book on private international law, the latter mentioning Yugoslavia
as place of Publication; however, neither one refers to any provisions or substantive
thoughts or opinions (in the legal sense) in it so that we are in the dark about the
content of his 1950 contribution. It would be most appropriate indeed if we could com-
pare through Yugoslav eyes eastern and western doctrine and practice.
20. Pp. 79-80.
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tional law as an instrument of foreign trade policy and in general
of foreign policy, whose starting point is the simultaneous coexist-
ence of the socialist and capitalist states and the necessity of the
maintenance and development of relations between the states of
the two different social systems.21
"Primary conditions of these are the acknowledgment of the
equality and sovereignty of states, the respect for their interests,
non-intervention in their domestic affairs and the recognition of
the monopoly of foreign trade. Their science is, in the second
place, characterized by the fact that the regulation of the economic
relations between socialist states is based on the basic principles
of the unselfish and mutual economic assistance, on that of the
co-ordination of interests.22 In the third place their science is
characterized by class consciousness; the science of private inter-
national law in people's democratic countries is a fighting science,
which, as sciences of law in general, carries on an unrelenting
struggle against the theories of western capitalist states. '23 He
continues: "[W]eight and importance of the questions of private
international law are determined in a way which is different from
that which is reflected in the science of private international law
of capitalist states. Accordingly, certain questions, which are con-
sidered to be of primary importance in the science of capitalist
states, e.g. the problem of renvoi and off qualification, are deemed
to be of secondary importance only, whereas other questions to
which only secondary importance is attached in the science of
private international law of capitalist countries, e.g. the exemption
of a foreign state from the jurisdiction of domestic courts, are
treated as primarily important. ' ' 24
Following Ludwiczak, Professor Szaszy continues: "The litera-
ture of private international law of the people's democratic countries,
in contradistinction to the science of capitalist countries, lays stress
upon the following. The rules for the choice of law of imperialist
states are intended to ensure the monopolist position of their state.
For this reason, it is necessary to take a determined stand against
the possibility of abusing the law. In connection with the determina-
tion of the law of persons, the acceptance of the lex domicilii in
the immigration states serves the purpose that the immigrant, as
21. (Reviewer's Italics).
22. (Author's italics).
23. Pp. 99-100. (Reviewer's italics).
24. P. 100. Says Ehrenzweig: "International theoryA speaks of renvoi where the 'whole'
foreign, law which has been found applicable under the choice of law rule of the forum
would, under its own choice of law rule, treat the question as subject to the law ofthe forum (remission) or to the law of a third state (transmission)." EHRENZWEIG, Op. cit.
supra note 9, at 334-335. He quotes agreeingly Rabel "who sees in the concept of renvoi
'a classic example of violently prejudiced literature confronting naively consistent prac-
tice.' " Id. at 340. It goes without saying that Professor Szaszy must be aware of the
more modern tendencies in what he likes to call the capitalist world; however, he Is
greatly concerned with all theories and practices which have aroused the ire and dis-
trust of governments behind the Iron Curtain for many years.
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soon as possible, forget his old country, becoming in this way more
manageable. The reduced number of rules for the choice of law
is intentional, especially in the domain of the law of obligations,
because in this way it becomes possible for the capitalist better
to control his capital; namely, clear and detailed rules for the
choice of law in private international law may induce the courts
to decide in many cases in favour of foreigners, and this is what
the capitalist states have no intention to allow. In capitalist states,
detailed and numerous rules for the choice of law may be found
exclusively in family law; this is accounted for by the fact that
capitalists consider the conclusion of marriage and divorce as ques-
tions of a financial character, the regulation of which is therefore
considered necessary. The attitude of the literature of private
international law in capitalist states is negative vis-a-vis the
principle of the renvoi as the capitalist states want to force their
views upon the others and to assure the superiority of their capital
in international trade. The clause of the ordre public is intended
to safeguard the interests of the ruling class and its purpose is
to prevent the recognition of the nationalizations carried out in
socialist states. Bourgeois science of private international law at-
taches great importance to the problem of nationality of legal
persons, because this problem is of overriding importance in capi-
talist economy." 25
The reviewer has quoted at some length in order to indicate
how consciously and sharply socialist doctrine enters into the legal
sphere of what, in praxi, as we shall see later, are frequently
reasonable and sometimes almost identical decisions and maxims.
This can be seen later on in the discussion of the conflict between
substantive rules and their points of contact.
Connecting Factors
A theory of connecting factors has been established both in
private international law of the west and of the east. The following
elements are considered connecting factors: "the nationality of the
parties (lex patriae), the domicile of the parties (lex domicilii),
their ordinary or permanent residence (lex residentiae), the seat
of the legal person (siege social), the place where the object of
the legal relation is situated (lex rei sitae), the place of the legal
act performed, of the contract made, of the delict committed (lex
loci actus, lex loci contractus, lex loci delicti commissi) as well
as the place of performance (lex loci solutionis), the seat of the
court (lex fori), the agreement of the contracting parties on the
law which is to govern their contract (lex pro voluntate), the
nationality of the flag, the place of registration of the ship, of the
aircraft, etc. In this context, too, the law governing legal relation
25. Pp. 100-101.
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in general is termed lex causae, which may be lex personalis,
lex obligationis, lex successionis, etc. ' 2 6
Professor Szaszy states that in capitalist countries the formation
of connecting factors also serves the interest of the ruling classes
and contains, among others, connecting factors of supranational
importance which originate in a super state, whereas the theory
of the connecting factors in people's democracies as well as in
the Soviet Union stress national character of connecting factors.
In most territories of Anglo-Saxon law and in some Latin-American
countries as well as in Scandinavian and Dutch law the lex domicilii
is considered authoritative whereas, in the socialist countries lex
patriae is generally applied except for certain specified cases. He
specifically wishes to oppose the use of the lex fori (which is pre-
cisely the one that is most applied in and by Ehrenzweig) because
it is "in the interest of the ruling class. . . .In capitalist states
one of the devices for the unlimited extension of the application
of the lex fori was the antidemocratic, reactionary utilization of
the proviso of public policy against people's democratic and Soviet
rules of law, which were connected with the foundations of the
construction of socialist conditions of society. ' 27 He then cites a
number of cases in which in his opinion capitalist courts have
slighted and disadvantaged Soviet citizens or legal persons by the
use of the lex fori. Of more than passing interest are his frequent
allusions to the rights of political refugees and the question of dual
nationality, the former extensively approved of, whereas the latter
is seldom regulated by legislation in the people's democracies.
Nor does the literature of people's democratic states accept
the "dominant capitalist theory which intends to apply the qualifica-
tions adopted by the lex fori, because. . .the purpose of the
qualification based on the lex fori is the unlimited extension of the
field of their domestic substantive law for the satisfaction of im-
perialist interests as well as the preclusion of the application of
the law of socialist states. 2 2 Professor Szaszy asks properly
whether the principal application of the law of the stronger inter-
connection should be accepted as has been the case in Germany.29
He then maintains "that in capitalist countries courts have seriously




29. It may not be amiss to indicate here that the practical effect of the application
of the lex patriae or lex fori may be frequently the same. The case of Babcock v. Jack-
son, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963) constitutes one such instance. There the
New York Court of Appeals, reversing a long line of precedents, held that New York
law would apply to an accident which occurred in Ontario, but which began and ended
in New York, and resulted in litigation between two New York residents. Regardless of
whether lex fori or lex patriae would be used, the result would be the same. It seems
to us rather far fetched even to consider application of the Canadian statute since the
Province of Ontario cannot have any conceivable interest in the accident in question. But




cases at indefensible judgments. . .[which] are contradictory to
the purpose and essence of private international law because the
purpose. . .is to widen international relations and to ensure inter-
national and political cooperation. [Thus] legal writers should
fight with all their energy at their disposal against abuses of
qualifications on the basis of lex fori."' 0
Application and Preclusion of Foreign Substantive Law
It is particularly interesting to watch the differences in legal
opinions between most of the capitalist countries and most of the
socialist countries. The difference does not seem so much whether
the application of law does or does not depend on the will of the
party, but the difference is shown by the fact that the ex-officio
application of foreign law in capitalist countries is a marked con-
tradiction to the right of disposal of the parties, which is the
cardinal principle of civil procedure.
As far as application of foreign substantive law is concerned,
Professor Szaszy points to the difference between capitalist coun-
tries and those in the Russian orbit and states that in the latter
"the application of foreign law is independent of the will of the
parties."' Of course, Professor Szaszy does not find any contra-
diction in the legal systems of people's democratic states because
"in these countries the principle of the right of disposal, of the
parties a limine permits the court to take steps in the law suit,
if this is required by the interests of the state, or of the working
people, or it is deemed necessary to elucidate objective truth. 'S 2
Interestingly while the parties have, of course, the right to
disposal, "it is the right (and duty) of the courts for example to
initiate proceedings, to give information and advise [sic] to the
parties, approve or refuse their renunciation, acknowledgment and
settlement. . . [or] as provided in Soviet law to take action ex-
ceeding the request submitted in the statement of the claim."3 3
If the application of foreign substantive law creates some dif-
ficulties the preclusion of the application of foreign substantive
law creates even more. Professor Szaszy also is quite aware, of
course, that foreign law, if otherwise applicable will not be applied
contrary to public policy, (in east or west) but it is precisely in
the definition of the concept of public policy that the basic differences
lie. He admits "that the actual content... is relative, that it changes
. . .with place and time. . .and that it can be determined only on
30. P. 135.
31. P. 148. In spite of the seeming difference which Professor Szaszy makes, thisquestion again is handled identically on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In fact, it couldbe argued that the much-vaunted differences stressed by eastern European authors are
either nonexistent or represent differences between the common law and the civil law.32. Ibid. (Reviewer's italics).
33. P. 149.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ground of legislative and political ideas.. "84 Whereas in his
opinion, in the capitalist countries "law is the will. . .of the ruling
class" 35 and public policy naturally carries class character, in the
people's democratic countries "the principle of political interest
has no importance as general excluding principle, because. .the
application of foreign law may be refused on account of a conflict
with political interest only if the consideration of the political in-
terests of the state concerned is required also by the public policy
of that state. 3 6 A very fine distinction indeed.
Professor Szaszy further states that "all authors in the Soviet
Union and the people's democratic countries admit, correctly, that
the principle of public policy is needed in all countries capitalist
and socialist alike. Similarly, all authors admit, correctly, that
the courts are authorized to disregard the application of a rule
of foreign law only in the cases where the positive effect of foreign
law is contrary to domestic public policy. All of them agree, also
correctly, on the principle of the relativity of public policy, on
the necessity of making distinction between domestic and foreign
public policy, between general and special clauses of public policy,
on the importance of existence of the idea of domestic connection,
on the concept that if there is a change in public policy the new
one shall be considered on the necessity of disregarding clauses
of public policy if they result in unjust decisions and finally on
the necessity of applying this clause also in international civil
procedure."37
SPECIAL PART:
SUBJECTS AT LAW AND RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP
In the "specific" part, Professor Szaszy deals with the subjects
at law and the law of persons, the right of ownership, legal
protection, personal rights attached to intellectual creative activity,
the law of obligations in general, sales, settling of accounts,
carriage of goods in foreign trades, labor and family law, and the
law of succession.
The first important differences between the law of the people's
democracies and the west may be found in the regulation of legal
capacity. Within the limits of public policy all issues are decided
by the lex patriae; however, Professor Szaszy agrees that all rights
belonging to the foetus, for instance, do not belong to the domain
of legal capacity and those are not to be decided in accordance






lex patriae also governs the question whether in a concrete case
disposing capacity exists at all, whether it is not limited, what the
complete absence of disposing capacity entails (nullity or void-
ability), in what manner absence of disposing capacity may be
redressed (e.g. approval of the guardian or of a statutory
representative or of some official authority), who is to be
considered as guardian or statutory representative. The lex patriae
governs the specific forms of disposing capacity (capacity to
conclude marriage, to make a will, and to be a passive party to
bills of exchange), furthermore, in capitalist countries, capacity to
carry on business, to conclude commercial transactions ...
Finally, the lex patriae governs the measures taken by the
authorities generally which change, terminate or restrict the
disposing capacity of persons (declaration of full age, the French
emancipation, prolongation of minority, termination of the prolong-
ation, suspension or termination of paternal authority, the French
interdiction and appointment of a consei judiciaire). Nevertheless,
in people's democratic countries legal systems consider in certain
-instances also the law of the domicile of the person as applicable
relevant to the above-mentioned official measures. . . . However,
disposing capacity, if once acquired, is an expedient not affected
in people's democratic countries by a change in personal law."38
Professor Szaszy continues, "it is a basic principle that in
respect of ownership and other real rights, as well as of possession
of things it is in general the lex rei sitae, the law in force at the
place where the object is situated, that shall apply, a very few
instances excepted. This is unanimously accepted in respect of
ownership, real rights and possession of real property, but recently
this principle holds good concerning ownership, real rights and
possession also on movable property, although some older statutes
in people's democratic countries. . .provides the personal law of
the possessor (the national law) as applicable. Nevertheless, even
in people's democratic countries where there had been such
statutes in force, judicial practice and science stand for the lex
rei sitae also in respect of movable property."8 9
Nationalization, confiscation, and expropriation
"In connection with the determination of the law applicable to
real [property] rights, writers on private international law in the
Soviet Union and people's democratic states analyse in detail the
international aspects of nationalization. . . . [T]wo main problems
have been emerging: (i) to what extent the act of nationalization is
valid in respect of foreign nationals and legal persons living in the
38. P. 200 (Reviewer's italics).
39. P. 221.
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country, (ii) to what extent such law is valid in respect of property
abroad of nationals and legal persons, in other words, to what extent
laws of nationalization have exterritorial effect. The second problem
may be further subdivided into two issues: (a) should the ownership
of the nationalizing state be recognized abroad in respect of property
that had been abroad at the time of the nationalization? (b) should
this ownership be recognized in respect of property which had been
in the country at the time and transferred abroad later?
"It is held in the private international law of the Soviet Union
and people's democratic countries that the concept of nationalization
is to be precisely distinguished from those of confiscation and
expropriation.40 Confiscation takes place on the ground of a judg-
ment, while nationalization is affected directly on the strength of a
statute.4 1 The basis of confiscation is a reason to be sought in the
person of the owner, his punishable or reproachable political attitude,
whereas the basis of nationalization is the nature of the property.
The character of confiscation is penal, that of nationalization is not.
Objects of expropriation are things ut singuli; consequently, it is a
case of a singular succession; on the other hand, nationalization
means universal succession. For this reason aspects of national-
ization in private international law ought not to be treated, strictly
speaking, in the chapter of private international law on the law of
property and other real rights, because the law of rights in rem
does not comprise the problem of universal succession.
[moreover,] the concepts of capitalist and socialist nationalization
are to be precisely distinguished. It is important to point out that
nationalization exists in capitalist states as well.
"As regards the problem of confiscation and expropriation,
opinion is uniform in people's democratic countries in the respect
that these decisions are to be recognized abroad even if the persons
subjected to these measures are foreign nationals or legal persons
(foreign states being the only exceptions) provided that the property
confiscated or expropriated is situated in the territory of the state
which has carried out the measures in question. Such decisions are
not to be recognized as valid if the property in question is situated
abroad, which means that decisions providing for expropriation or
confiscation have no extraterritorial effect.
"When discussing private international law problems of socialist
nationalization it is first of all pointed out by legal writers in people's
democratic states that the method of nationalization was not identical
in all these countries. In the Soviet Union and in some people's
democratic countries the legal independence of the various enter-




to the state; this means that the legal personality of the enterprises
was changed. In other people's democratic countries, e.g. in
Hungary, the various enterprises functioning in the form of joint
stock companies retained their legal personality, and in the statutes
on nationalization the ownership of the state over the various
enterprises was effected by way of nationalizing the shares.
"In the same manner as the validity of decisions on confiscation
and expropriation is to be recognized, even though the persons
subjected to these measures are foreign nationals or legal persons
provided the property confiscated or expropriated is situated in the
territory of the state which has so decided, the validity of the
statutes on nationalization is also to be recognized, provided the
foreign property nationalized is situated on the territory of the state
which has carried out the nationalization. This is admitted even by
western authors.42 On the other hand, whereas decisions providing
for confiscation and expropriation have no extraterritorial effect,
statutes on nationalization do have this effect, which means that the
validity of nationalizing statutes shall extend also to property which
had been in the respective country at the time of nationalization
and was transferred abroad later; they are valid even in respect
of property which was abroad at the time of nationalization.
"It is well known that courts in western states were endeavoring
to refuse recognition of the validity of statutes on nationalization.
They did not recognize the validity of those statutes on nationalization
which, as was done in the Soviet statutes, abolished the legal
personality of the nationalized enterprises because (i) these statutes
have no extraterritorial effect, as their character is penal, because
as a matter of fact, they decide essentially, in merit, on expropriation
or confiscation; (ii) though having extraterritorial effect, their
recognition was precluded by public policy; (iii) the statutes on
nationalization themselves restricted their validity to the country
concerned; (iv) they considered, by way of fictitious arguments,
the legal personality of the old enterprise as unchanged and they
considered property to be found abroad as a separate property, the
destination of which was to satisfy the creditors and to indemnify
the previous owners. Western courts did not recognize the validity
concerning property situated abroad of such statutes on national-
ization either which, as the Hungarian statutes, have maintained
the original legal personality of the enterprise, and they did this on
the ground that these statutes have no extraterritorial effect, or, if
they have, their recognition would be at variance with public policy.
The position of western courts was, of course, more difficult on this
point. The various arguments put forward by western courts have
been energetically refuted in the literature in people's democratic
42. (Reviewer's italics).
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states. These authors point out that the statutes on nationalization
cannot be considered as penal measures of confiscation or expropri-
ation, or in retaliation of a political attitude; that the scope of
persons affected under these statutes coincides with the sphere of
state power, therefore the validity of these statutes, as of all statutes,
covers every person living in the country and nationals and even
if they are staying abroad; that the non-recognition of the extra-
territorial validity of these statutes is susceptible of disintegrating
the whole system of private international law; that public policy
cannot be adduced to thwart a legal effect abroad, and if-under
the foreign law-this effect has already materialized at the time
of the dispute, public policy must not be an obstacle for the court
to enounce it; that public policy can only preserve an existing legal
position but cannot restore one which has become extinct; that
nationalization means universal transfer of ownership, and to the
latter the law in force at the seat of the legal person is to be applied. ' 4 3
These opinions are enforced by citing authorities from the Soviet
orbit.
Of course, Professor Szaszy is aware of changes in the judicial
practice of Western courts vis-a-vis Russian and other nationalizations
in line with the general rapprochement of east and west. Similarly,
in the field of legal protection of personal rights pertaining to
intellectual creative ability there are broad areas in which western
and eastern law coincide. There are, however, differences between
copyright and patent rights within the Soviet orbit; "Hungary
adhered in 1931 to the convention of Montevideo of January 11, 1899
on copyright. . .; this was concluded by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, and. . .differs. . .from the
Conventions of Bern and Rome. . ."" (in line with Ehrenzweig's
thinking). "Works of foreign authors enjoy protection in people's
democratic states, in general, according to the lex fori, if they were
first published in the country of the forum, furthermore, inasmuch
as the people's democratic country has membership in the Union
of Bern, also the works protected by the member states of the
Union. In other instances protection is due only if reciprocity has
been proved. Works of foreign authors are protected in the Soviet
Union, too, provided they were first published there, and only in
this contingency.
"Finally, it should be added that it is pointed out by authors in
people's democratic countries and the Soviet Union that the multi-
lateral international conventions discussed above serve first of all
the interests of the great publishing houses, and only in the second
line those of the authors. '45
43. Pp. 231-235.
44. P. 244.
45. P. 247. (Reviewer's italics).
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It would go too far to follow in detail the author's discussion of
other rights such as liens, industrial property, inventions, and trade-
marks; suffice it to say that he places main emphasis on bilateral
conventions rather than on overall codification.
Law of Obligations
In his discussion of the law of obligations (contracts) in general
Professor Szaszy points out his belief that "in western countries
the greatest legal uncertainty prevails in the domain of the inter-
national law of obligations. ' 46 Not only do conflict rules differ
considerably, but they have also been subject to judicial practice
and jurisprudence; "soviet and people's democratic authors point
out that this permanent insecurity in law is not a causal [sic] 4 7
phenomenon but is due to the fact that it is not intended to lay down
firm and precise principles in this domain by way of legislation,
as the protection of the ruling classes and the powerful monopolies
may be affected in this way. This insecurity in law is detrimental
to international trade. . . .,, Professor Szaszy complains that
international conferences have been unsuccessful in remedying the
situation.
The reproach of legal uncertainty, however, is one of those
ethnocentric phenomena we have been speaking of in the introduction.
It appears in such instances as the choice of law rule and in the
case of Walton v. Arabian American Oil Company.49 In domestic
American law, it may be discovered in the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, where in many instances a governmental unit may not
be sued without its consent, but which has been abolished for federal
purposes by the Federal Tort Claims Act. It has been argued that
where this somewhat archaic principle still prevails a state denies
itself half of its legal (the passive) capacity and ceases to be a
state of law in the European sense (Rechtsstaat). American legal
scholars are fairly unanimous in the condemnation of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. However, they register their disapproval
in terms of its injustice, illogic, and inconsistency with the nature
of representative government, rather than using European
argumentation."
46. P. 258.
47. The author probably meant to use "casual."
48. Ibid. (Reviewer's italics).
49. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956), in which plaintiff,
"a citizen of Arkansas, who, while temporarily in Saudi Arabia, was seriously injured
when an automobile he was driving collided with a truck owned by defendant, driven by
one of defendant's employees." Id. at 542. The complaint was dismissed for failure to
plead the pertinent Saudi Arabian law. Saudi Arabian "law" was put in quotation marks,
assuming that its existence should have to be proved; as if conduct that is obviously
tortious in one country would not be so regarded in another. We consider this another
example of ethnocentrism, and there seems little merit in assuming that nobody has law
but the in-group. But cf. Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951).
50. EHRENzwEIO, op. cit. supra note 9, at 108. Ehrenzweig admits that "whatever the
original policy reasons for this rule [sovereign Immunity] may have been, both Congress
and the judiciary have, over the last 150 years, increasingly taken account of a grow-
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With regard to the passive capacity of foreign administrators
and executors Ehrenzweig indicates that "contrary to traditional
assumption, foreign administrators and executors can ordinarily be
sued. And they can be sued not only upon 'new causes of action',
but generally like any other individuals, subject only to the rules
of governing personal jurisdiction. This rule, having been part of
colonial and early American common law, has now (after an interval
of non-suability probably caused by legalistic identification of active
and passive capacity), been widely restored." 5' 1
In any event, Professor Szaszy concedes, with regard to legal
capacities, that there is a wide range of differences not only between
the bourgeois countries but also between the conflict rules in various
people's democratic countries.52
So, for instance, "the principle of the lex pro voluntate ["the
agreement of the contracting parties on the law which is to govern
their contract"] is admitted in all people's democratic countries
. . . [however,] in the matter of application of this principle there
are important differences. .. ,,5
Family and Labor Law
The prime example of essential sameness, however, appears to
be in family law. Professor Szaszy indicates how author's in people's
democratic countries and the Soviet Union diverge in the aspect of
family law from the west. He continues: "the main principles of
socialist family law are: equality of rights of men and women,
monogamy, greatest possible protection of children, marriage can
be dissolved only owing to serious and well-founded reasons, no
difference can be made between children born in or out of wedlock
and/or, at most difference can be made only on the ground that
the proving of decendency is subjected to more rigorous requirements
ing 'chilly feeling against sovereign immunity.' " Ibid. In a note he quotes Justice Frank-
furter on this "anachronistic survival of monarchical privilege." The principle according
to which the state, i.e., the Emperor, may be sued was recognized by Maximilian I, who
in 1516 appointed officers (Die Kaminerprokuratoren) and established an office (Die
Kammerprokuratur) to represent the Crown and its domain against suits deriving from
damages of all sorts. As a point of historical interest, the office still exists in the Austrian
Republic under the name of Finanzprokuratur.
51 EUPsENZWEIG, op. Cit. supra note 9 at 61-62. As a matter of interest, by 1960 at least
eight states, including North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 30-24-18 [1960]) have, "with or
without modifications, established by statute the foreign administrator's general standing
to be sued." Ibid.
52. In a review of LuNz, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1961), 11 AM. J. COMP. L.
464 (1962), Professor Baade points out, inter alia, that the Soviet authors are defenders
of sovereign immunity, apparently in pursuit of recognition of their nationalization, ex-
propriation and confiscation policies. He also points out the change between the first
edition of Lunz's book in 1949 and its second edition, in German, in 1961. The "tremen-
dous improvement of the Soviet Union's position in world affairs has brought about
incisive changes in official Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The expansion of Soviet-type Social-
ism into a world system has drastically decreased the need for many of the repressive
concomitants of 'Socialism in one country.' Especially in view of the emergence of neu-
tralism, the possibility of the world-wide establishment of Socialism by means short of
war is now both admitted as a theoretical possibility and officially favored as the
optimum solution." Id. at 466. Thus a period of relatively undisturbed progress in theory
and method may be foreseen with a softening of ethnocentric cultural tendencies.
53. P. 262-263.
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if the father and mother have not been married."5 4 Does that sound
strange or foreign to us? Is not, in fact, the difference in the
concepts of family law between socialist and capitalist states a
purely rhetorical one?
Naturally in the field of labor law there are more than casual
differences. Here we have to deal with the very core of Marxian
thought. It would be important, of course, to consider whether
labor is an exploited mass or a self-respecting part of the population.
However, it is not particularly relevant whether labor law belongs
to the area of public law or civil law or whether it is a law of
sui generis, to judge from the not quite five pages that Professor
Szaszy devotes to the whole of labor law inasmuch as it deals with
private international legal aspects; we may then conclude that there
is a dearth of either material or ideas on hand.
Finally with regard to the law of succession-again a very
brief chapter-the differences are provided by the basis of socialist
thinking. Obviously, in socialist states there can be no transfer of
capital, but only transfer of property and thus, all rhetoric again
does not hide the fact that in detail many of the same rules apply.
Regardless of Marxist phraseology, which, of course, is considerable
in the volume under discussion, it can be said, and shown without
too much difficulty that basic feeling for law and justice in the
capitalist and socialist countries is not too different.
CONCLUSION
The use of the book is somewhat restricted by the absence of
subject and author indices. However, Professor Szaszy is not a
newcomer in the field of private international law; he is one of its
distinguished elder statesman, listing nearly fifty references of his
own stretching from 1928 to this time. Nor are the authorities
quoted by him and still living and working behind the Iron
Curtain negligible quantities. Thus, little purpose can be s'erved in
considering the law of socialist countries to be no law at all. The
book under review shows very clearly that time behind the Iron
Curtain did not stand still. When Ehrenzweig writes "Russian
doctrine has never broken its relation with continental tradition,"
' 55
he is by indirection talking about the European people's democracies
as well, for he goes on to admonish the American reader to
"profit from the new thinking and experimentation that has
escaped him for two generations"5 6 and sees "many other clear
and hopeful trends. Thus, vested interests and 'governing' laws
have been largely discarded, fruitful distinctions are made between
54. P. 340.
55. EHRENZWEIO, op. cit. supra note 9, at 322,
56. Id. at 323.
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the 'interstate' or interregional conflicts within the USSR and the
Russian orbit, on the one hand, and international conflicts, on the
other. And, most important in the present context, Russian doctrine
seems to have restored the general principle that, in the absence
of compelling grounds for displacing the lex fori, 'the existence of
a foreign element is no reason for the application of foreign law.' ,,5"
This seems to us a singularly benign interpretation of Lunz and
others whose work has been translated into German, and is
therefore relatively easily accessible.5 8
Basically, however, we are glad to agree that after the
gruesomeness of two world wars, civil wars, and revolutions, a
certain healthy respect for international legal relationships seems
to be appearing.
It is not a question of appeasement nor of cold-war tactics that
prompts us to look forward hopefully to the time when out of legal
principles ethical norms can be created which, in turn will serve
to soften the fear of death and destruction and to unite peoples in
a common objective search for mutually beneficial legal under-
standing.
57. Ibid.
58. See also Ehrenzweig's incisive and insightful review of 1 LuNZ, INTERNATIONALES
PRTVATRECHT (1961) and PETERESKI & KRYLOV, JAHRBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVA-
TRECHTS (1962), 57 AM. J. INT'L L., 685 (1963), in which he says, at 687: [T]he fact
remains that Russian scholars have begun to pay serious attention to American case law
and doctrine at a time when many Continental and even English scholars still treat our
law as terra incognita, and when, on the other hand, much of American writing con-
tinues to Ignore the results of Eastern research, whose characterization as 'Communist'
is usually as meaningless as that of Western doctrine as 'capitalist.' " These sentiments
are echoed by Sean MacBride, Secretary-General of the International Commission of
Jurists, who recently said, "Lawyers have a sacred duty to preserve the physical, moral
and intellectual Integrity of human beings." TIme, January 15, 1965, p. 41.
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TRANSCENDENT JUSTICE: THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF CON-
STITIONALISM, by Carl J. Friedrich.* Lilly Endowment Research
Program in Christianity and Politics. Durham: Duke University
Press, 1964. Pp. 116, $3.50.
There is evidence of a tremendous amount of scholarship in the
pages of this slender volume. It is not easy reading; yet anyone
interested in the theology underlying constitutionalism will be richly
rewarded by a careful study of Professor Friedrich's book.
The author asserts that Western constitutionalism is basically a
product of Christian culture. It may be objected that the roots of
constitutionalism reach back into classical antiquity and have their
true foundation in Greece and Rome. He disposes of the objection
by pointing out that "in short, the politeia of Aristotle even in its
normative conception as a model political order lacks its specific
modern connotation: the exclusion of the government from a person-
al sphere and more specifically from the sphere of religion. This
lack was equally noteworthy in the Roman tradition."' In the
classical age the accent was on law as a means of producing a
strong state. "Roman 'constitutionalism' . . . rested upon a pagan
evaluation of human life in terms of virtus, and such virtus or
manliness was understood as predominance on the battlefield and
in the market place of political rivalry. ' 2
St. Augustine, as a student of Plato and a Roman citizen, reflected
the same attitude. He had little faith in human government and
looked forward to the City of God for the perfection of man. St.
Thomas and other medieval thinkers, on the other hand, evolved a
truly Christian concept of constitutionalism, whose function is to
define and maintain human rights. ". . . what has persisted through-
out the history of Western constitutionalism is the notion that the
individual human being is of paramount worth and should be pro-
tected against the interference of his ruler, be he a prince, a party
or a popular majority."' 3 The principle of checks and balances was
recognized by the scholastic philosophers. Both subjects and rulers
must acknowledge the sovereignty of the Divine Will. Man enjoys
*Eaton Professor of the Science of Government, Harvard; Professor of Political
Science, Heidlberg.
1. P. 8. All page numbers, unless otherwise noted, refer to the book under review.
2. ibid.
3. P. 17.
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liberty under the law; government ultimately receives its authority
from God.
The Protestant influence in this field was strong from the begin-
ning of the Reformation. Richard Hooker probably made the most
important contribution to the Protestant tradition of constitutionalism.
He summed up his view of the transcendent basis of all law in these
words: "Of Law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her
seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world: all
things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very last as feeling
her case, and the greatest as not exempted from her power. ' 4
The mainstream of the Christian tradition continues in the think-
ing of Kant and Locke. The latter writes: 5 "The Freedom then of
Man and Liberty of acting according to his own Will, is grounded on
his having Reason, which is able to instruct him in that Law he is
to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the
freedom of his own will." In other words, the law of nature is the
law of reason and both are in effect the law of God.
The notion of absolute rights based on natural law was firmly
established before the Constitution of the United States was drafted.
What had been suggested in the English Declaration of 1689 was
incorporated in some colonial constitutions.
During the nineteenth century rationalism looked upon rights as
constitutionally created and guaranteed; the Christian notion that
rights are universal and absolute was widely rejected. This was
emphasized by Chief Justice Vinson even as late as June 4, 1951 in
his statement: "Nothing is more certain in modern society than
the principle that there are no absolutes. . .. "I
In the twentieth century there has been a shift of emphasis from
basic rights to freedoms. There is less interest in abstract rights
and more concern over the freedoms so dramatically formulated
by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Bill of Rights as originally adopted
no longer seems adequate; it is being spelled out in detail by demands
for social security; the right to vote; emancipation from an inter-
ference in what we read, think or say; universal education, etc.
At the moment, the struggle for the rights and freedoms, especially
the right to equal opportunities for education, of racial minorities
best illustrates this point. Dr. Friedrich says: "How to combine
these newer rights with those recognized earlier has become a
serious problem everywhere. This problem- cannot, as .mentioned
before, be solved in universal terms."17 The author pins his hopes
4. P. 56.
5. LocKs, The Second Treatise § 63, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 327 (Laslet
ed. 1960).
6. Dennis v. United States, $41 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
7. P. 108.
BOOK REVIEWS
for a solution or at least an improvement of the situation on "a
soundly organized democratic process."
It was recognized early in our national history that this process
can not function effectively and, as John Adams expressed it,
"liberty cannot be preserved, without a general knowledge among
the people, who have a right, from the frame of their nature, to
knowledge."
Professor Friedrich places much emphasis on the importance
of educational opportunity on an equal basis for all citizens if the
democratic process is to function properly. But he does not give an
adequate answer to the question asked in the foreword by the
Director of the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity
and Politics, namely: "Can constitutional government survive the
demise of a religious and philosophical orientation that originally
nurtured its growth?"
THE MOST REV. LEO F. DWORSHAK*
COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW, by Conrad W. Oberdorfer,
Alfred Gleiss, and Martin Hirsch. Chicago: Commerce Clearing
House, Inc., 1963. Pp. 225, $15.00.
By tradition Europe is the land of cartelization. As a conse-
quence, the administration of the antitrust provisions contained in
the treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC),
better known as the Common Market, has created a host of problems
whose solution is complicated and time-consuming. By the fall of
1964, 37,000 agreements between companies doing business in the
Common Market had been submitted to the EEC Commission for a
determination of whether or not these agreements ran afoul of the
Common Market antitrust regulations.1 Since the beginning of 1963
the Commission has been engaged in the difficult and unenviable
task of formulating criteria for typical agreements which would be
under the prohibition of the EEC Treaty and for those which would
be permitted to continue in operation. At the close of 1964 only a
few decisions had been rendered by the Commission; in three cases
the agreements were found to be inoffensive, in three other cases
the Commission expressed disapproval.2
*Bishop of the Diocese of Fargo. A.B., 1922, St. John's University, (Minn.); S.T.B.,
1925, St. John's Seminary; LL.D., Loras Coll.
1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1964, § (Financial), p. 1, col. 1.
2. See European Community. July. 1964, p. 10; Aug.-Sept.. 1964. 1. 15: Oct.. 1964. p. 9.
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As more and more American firms engage in business within
the Common Market countries, it becomes increasingly necessary
for American lawyers and businessmen to gain a measure of know-
ledge about the antitrust laws of the EEC. The authors of Common
Market Cartel Law seek to meet this need. They state in the preface
that their book "is designed primarily to serve as a working tool
for the American lawyer and corporate executive dealing with
operations of American business establishments or their foreign
subsidiaries or of joint American-European undertakings in one or
more of the Common Market countries."
The book is basically a translation of the original German work
by two of the authors, Gleiss and Hirsch, which appeared in October,
1962, but the American version takes into account some of the
developments that occurred since that date. Its format follows the
usual pattern of German legal commentaries which normally present
only a detailed examination and discussion of individual statutory
provisions without furnishing a systematic introduction to the subject
matter. The provisions commented upon by the authors are articles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, the core of the Common Market cartel
law, and the provisions contained in Regulations 17, 26, and 27.
Regulations 17 and 27 implement the rules found in articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty and have, therefore, assumed great importance;
Regulation 26 deals with the application of the rules of competition
to agricultural products which had been exempted from these rules
prior to the promulgation of this Regulation.3
As the book was published originally in Germany, it is not
surprising that it is primarily oriented toward the legal situation
with which German enterprises are confronted. Throughout the book
ample references are made to German literature which may not
be too meaningful to the American lawyer. On several occasions,
however, reference is also made to American antitrust law, and
appropriate court decisions and literature are cited, thus greatly
enhancing the value of the book for the interested public in the
United States.
In general, the commentaries of the authors on the various legal
provisions are well reasoned and frequent examples are used to
illustrate important points. The major problem areas such as what
constitutes a concerted practice or what is meant by distortion of
competition are examined in great detail, and in this endeavor the
authors have emphasized legal practice rather than academic
analysis, an obvious advantage to the practicing lawyer or business
executive. On the other hand, certain highly complex problems of
S. Article 42, EEC Treaty.
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a doctrinal nature such as the effect of agreements that might be
voided retroactively by the Commission or the legal situation of
cartels not requiring notification4 should have been examined in
greater depth since the practical consequences of solutions for these
problems might be far-reaching. 5
The translation of the original German book into English is
excellent and meets fully the requirements of an American reader
from the view point of legal technicality as well as general style.
One exception to this encomium is the translation of the conclusions
of the Bosch6 case rendered by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities in 1962, which seems to follow too literally the German
text of this decision and could have been improved upon.7 One
may also have some reservations about the advisability of adding
a third English translation of articles 85 and 86 to existing ones as
the authors have done." As a consequence there are now seven
texts of these provisions: four in the official languages of French,
German, Dutch, and Italian, and three unofficial English versions.
While the German and Dutch texts of the Treaty appear to support
the rewording of article 85, the French text does not offer such
support. Moreover, the authors admit that the rewording will not
have any appreciable practical effect; 9 on the other hand, three
English versions of the Treaty's antitrust provisions tend to cause
confusion and make an already difficult situation more vexing.
There are certain weaknesses in the book which, if remedied,
would have greatly added to its value for the American lawyer.
First, a concise and systematic introduction to the subject matter
would have been most helpful. Such an introduction covering articles
85 to 94 of the Treaty would have provided the practicing lawyer
with an insight into the full scope of the common market antitrust
provisions and would have made it easier for him to understand
the references to some of these articles made by the authors in
their commentaries. Second, some space should have been devoted
to the "legislative" intent in the drafting of articles 85 ff. These
provisions are the result of a compromise between the framers of
the Treaty, and some historical knowledge in this respect would
enhance the reader's comprehension of the EEC antitrust law.10
Third, a brief survey of the cartel law in the member states as
far as it exists would have been invaluable. American firms oper-
ating in the Common Market countries may not only be subject to
4. Article 4[2], Regulation 17.
5. For example, in case of damage suits instituted by third parties. See the dis-
cussions on pp. 94 and 106 ff. of the reviewed book.
6. See 8 SAMMLUNG DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DES GERICHTSHOFES 97, 103, [1962] 1
C.M.L.R. 1.
7. pp. 87-90.
8. One translation has been made by the Publishing Service of the European Com-
munities and the other by Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
9. p. 19.
10. In this respect see the excellent article by Ellis, Source Material for Article 85 (1)
of the EEC Treaty, FORDHAM L. REv. 247 (1963).
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the EEC antitrust regulations but also to national cartel law. The
relationship between the Common Market cartel law and the national
laws presents many problems of which the American lawyer and
business executive must be aware if he is to guide successfully the
business activities of an American firm in Western Europe.1 If
such a survey had been included in the book, references of the
authors to pertinent national court decisions in the Common Market
states might have assumed added meaning.
Despite these weaknesses Common Market Cartel Law is a
significant contribution not only to the literature on European Com-
munity law but also to an understanding of antitrust legislation and
law in general. Although in a sense any book dealing with a topic
as dynamic as the development of cartel law in the Common Market
is dated the moment the ink is dry on the last page, many of the
concepts developed or discussed by the authors in their book have
lasting value. The price of fifteen dollars for the book, however,
appears to be somewhat excessive.
WERNER FELD*
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, by Louis W. Koenig. New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1964. Pp. 415, $6.00.
Louis W. Koenig, Professor of government at New York
University, has written an arresting study of the United States
Presidency. The subject matter should make it appealing to lawyers,
and its freedom from a heavily academic style renders it easy as
well as interesting reading. Koenig analyzes the American Presi-
dency in its various constitutional aspects, as well as those functions
which executive leadership can (or should, as you will) involve. He
gives the reader interesting accounts of Presidential practice, past
and present.
The theme of this book is that the American Presidency is not
constitutionally adequate to the task at hand in these times of
domestic and foreign crisis. The author is particularly critical of
Congress, its hoary rules, its seniority system, and its jealous
protection of its own independence from the executive.
I leave it to scholarly research to confirm, but it seems a good
11. In this connection see Deringer, The Distribution of Powers in the Enforcement
of the Rules of Competition under the Rome Treaty, 1 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 30 (1964).
*Chairman, Department of Political Science and Economics, Moorhead State College.
L.L.B. 1933, Berlin; Ph.D. 1962. Tulane. Author, THE COURT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES: NEw DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1964).
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guess that similar complaints have been made in times of national
emergencies in the past; yet our system has proved flexible enough
to do the job. Given overwhelming public support the chief executive
can win the necessary congressional support; without such an
extensive public consensus it may well be that Presidential power
should be limited.
Professor Koenig's book is not a mere collection of general
observations. Rather, as each aspect of the Presidency is considered,
such as tenure, foreign affairs, military leadership, the reader is
supplied with carefully considered recommendations for improve-
ment. Finally, we are presented with a comparison between the
American Presidency and the chief executive officer in other nations.
Koenig forthrightly urges changes that will give the nation a
stronger national executive. In recent history this makes him an
admirer of Democratic Presidents, but does not necessarily make
him a political liberal. Over the years both major parties have
elected men to the Presidency who believe in a strong national
executive. The current conservative theme that a strong executive
weakens the federal system has no historical roots in conservatism.
Nor must support of so-called "state's rights" logically call for
opposition to a vigorous Presidency.
I can agree with the author's view that a strong Presidency is
desirable, and, to me, the case stands without aid of reference to
domestic and international emergencies. However, I find this book
somewhat one-sided in its presentation. Most readers will want to
hear from spokesmen on the other side of the counsel table before
deciding the case. Very likely Professor Koenig, a teacher of
political science, will be satisfied if this provocative book stimulates
the reader to make further inquiry.
JONATHAN C. EATON, JR.*
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